Bayesian inference as applied in a legal setting is about belief transfer and involves a plurality of agents and communication protocols. A forensic expert (FE) may communicate to a trier of fact (TOF) first its value of a certain likelihood ratio with respect to FE's belief state as represented by a probability function on FE's proposition space. Subsequently FE communicates its recently acquired confirmation that a certain evidence proposition is true. Then TOF performs likelihood ratio transfer mediated reasoning thereby revising their own belief state. The logical principles involved in likelihood transfer mediated reasoning are discussed in a setting where probabilistic arithmetic is done within a meadow, and with Adams conditioning placed in a central role.

We take another look at the general problem of selecting a preferred probability measure among those that comply with some given constraints. The dominant role that entropy maximization has obtained in this context is questioned by arguing that the minimum information principle on which it is based could be supplanted by an at least as plausible "likelihood of evidence" principle. We then review a method for turning given selection functions into representation independent variants, and discuss the tradeoffs involved in this transformation.

Non-deductive reasoning systems are often representation dependent: representing the same situation in two different ways may cause such a system to return two different answers. Some have viewed this as a significant problem. For example, the principle of maximum entropyhas been subjected to much criticism due to its representation dependence. There has, however, been almost no work investigating representation dependence. In this paper, we formalize this notion and show that it is not a problem specific to maximum entropy. In fact, we show that any representation-independent probabilistic inference procedure that ignores irrelevant information is essentially entailment, in a precise sense. Moreover, we show that representation independence is incompatible with even a weak default assumption of independence. We then show that invariance under a restricted class of representation changes can form a reasonable compromise between representation independence and other desiderata, and provide a construction of a family of inference procedures that provides such restricted representation independence, using relative entropy.